On July 13 and 14, France attempted to present an image of European power. On the eve of the country's national holiday, in his final speech to the military, Emmanuel Macron stated that peace is the objective, but that "we love freedom and the law… we are ready to fight to defend them," even at the cost of blood, if required. Shortly before, he had argued that Europe is transforming into a power, a force resting on its constituent states while respecting their sovereign decisions. Speaking from the Hôtel de Brienne before French soldiers, he referenced the blood already spilled by France's fallen. However, he never clarified who exactly constituted the political subject behind "we," notes an analysis by Modern Diplomacy.
On the same day, more than 30 governments of the "Coalition of the Willing" met around Volodymyr Zelensky at the Hôtel des Invalides in a summit co-hosted by France, Britain, and Germany. The following morning, military units opened the largest military parade in recent years along the Champs-Élysées, which the Élysée Palace framed around the motto of Europe's "strategic awakening." According to the Élysée, the parade highlighted three elements: France's rearmament, France's strategic autonomy, and Europe's strategic awakening. Read closely, this phrasing reveals something critical: France rearms, France is autonomous, Europe awakens. The first two follow state logic, while the third describes a process involving a community of states. The awakening is real, as is the rearmament; Europe is increasing its defense spending and its societies have recognized the existential threat. Yet these two days revealed more than intended, leading to conclusions the main protagonists never wished to highlight.
The problem of "we": France or Europe?
The first lesson is that Macron's phrase sounded like two different commitments, yet only one possesses a clear decision-making chain. Macron never clarified whether "we" referred to France or to the Europeans he had previously invoked. If "we" refers to France, the political entity is clear: promising to shed blood requires a society prepared to sacrifice lives and an authority capable of deciding to do so. France possesses both, as its constitutional system defines where military commitment begins, how it evolves, and, at the nuclear level, who holds the final word. That answer can even be "no." What matters for nuclear deterrence is that adversaries know precisely who must respond. However, if "we" applies to Europe, the picture changes entirely. The determination exists, but it is fragmented; the mechanisms exist, but they are split across a coalition of over 30 governments and a 32-nation alliance with distinct plans, commands, and forces already operational. Authority is scattered everywhere across Europe. What remains missing is a unified decision-making chain through which national commitments transform into a single response when support shifts into active warfare.
French nuclear deterrence and the limit of ambiguity
This ambiguity forms part of French strategic doctrine. France has never fully defined which interests it considers vital, and Macron argues that a rigid guarantee would prove dangerous by lowering the nuclear threshold and removing adversary uncertainty. Yet this ambiguity applies to where the red line lies—not to who decides. At the Île Longue nuclear submarine base, Macron explicitly stated that the chain of command is absolute and the final decision rests solely with the president. July 13th blurred something different: who exactly was making the pledge. That is why the same sentence carries vastly different weight depending on its interpretation. As France, it represents a national commitment backed by a political community and a concrete chain of command. As Europe, it becomes a warning to Moscow that aggression will not be accepted and anyone attempting a land grab will pay in human lives. This constitutes declaratory deterrence, but it binds no government on its own. It holds only as long as an adversary believes the multiple governments behind "we" will converge when the critical moment arrives.
France cannot command Europe
The second lesson is that while France can bring Europe to the table, it cannot command it. Macron allowed "we" to expand beyond French borders, and his initiatives this year represent an attempt to position France as the central pillar Europe lacks—acting as the state convening coalitions, the guarantor reassuring the most exposed, and the power whose strategic autonomy and nuclear umbrella could extend across the continent. However, a guarantor without a formal political agreement remains merely a self-appointed guarantor; Europe has delegated no such authority to Paris. Even recognized leadership would not resolve every issue. The US served as NATO's accepted core during the Cold War, yet Charles de Gaulle's France mistrusted that guarantee and built its independent nuclear arsenal. Warsaw could ask Paris the exact question Paris once posed to Washington. Yet Europe's difficulty runs deeper: Europe lacks even a unified power center to question.
Strategic autonomy imposed before it is built
The third lesson is that European autonomy is being forced into existence before it is built. For Washington, these two days sent a clear signal: Europe wants to show it is preparing to stand alone, even if America steps back. This necessity grew more acute following the NATO summit in Ankara, where the US president stated that Washington could withdraw all troops from Europe while criticizing the rejection of his demands regarding Greenland. The Pentagon had already announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany while reviewing the broader presence of roughly 80,000 American soldiers on the continent. Concurrently, allies reaffirmed their commitment to NATO's Article 5 and pledged 70 billion euros for Ukraine this year. This highlights a hard reality: a departing guarantor can be replaced, but a guarantor that simultaneously withdraws and remains cannot be easily substituted. Europe is thus forced to prepare for autonomy while operating inside an architecture it may eventually need to replace.
Moscow sees Europe's weakness
The fourth lesson is that a will dispersed across 30 capitals is easily discounted if decisions are not locked in advance. Moscow dismissed the coalition as a group of nations deceiving themselves. Russia understands that deterrence functions when an adversary can calculate the opposing forces and predict the trigger for their deployment. Europe possesses weapons and is expanding its armed forces. What it cannot yet demonstrate is a single joint decision at the threshold of conflict. A coalition of willing states that must be assembled mid-crisis is a coalition an adversary expects to disintegrate under pressure.
Ukraine has already crossed the threshold Europe fears
The fifth lesson concerns Ukraine. The Ukrainian soldiers marching alongside coalition troops in the parade were the only ones already tested in high-intensity conflict. Europe promised to defend an international order, whereas Ukraine was actively paying the price in human lives to prevent that order from collapsing. Ukraine possesses what 30 European nations have not yet managed to forge: a population ready to defend itself and a government capable of deploying its forces. Europe finds itself arming a country at war without having decided whether its own forces will ever enter the fight. The final and most critical conclusion is that Europe's awakening is real—political will exists, weapons are flowing, and new alliances are forming. What remains absent is a mechanism or authority capable of converting will into action when support transitions into direct conflict. Europe has awakened as a union of sovereign states sharing a purpose but lacking a joint command structure. History shows that power depends on a centralized decision-making center: the United States federalized its sovereignty, China centralized it, and Russia constructed a vertical system of power.
Europe chose a different path
The Union was explicitly designed to limit power concentration and prevent conflict among its members. Yet the very model that guaranteed internal peace now constrains its external strategic capacity. The two days of July exposed an incomplete political reality: joint capabilities developing faster than the joint authority needed to direct them. Europe is awake and active, yet it cannot decide as a single body the moment support turns into war. Its most decisive commitment remains a flexible coalition—a promise no single leader holds the absolute sovereignty to sign.
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